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20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) <p>This study evaluates the significance of nuclear proliferation as seen from the perspective of the Indian and Pakistani political-military leaderships, and speculates three hypothetical 1985 scenarios. Keywords:</p>		

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This study evaluates the significance of nuclear proliferation as seen from the perspective of the Indian and Pakistani political-military leaderships:

- (1) It examines what nuclear proliferation means to the power elites in each country (India and Pakistan);
- (2) It evaluates its relationship to, and significance for, the local opponent (India for Pakistan, and vice versa); and
- (3) It examines the effect of Indian and Pakistani proliferation on third parties, especially the PRC, U.S., and USSR.

The study then offers speculation as to the effect of Indian-Pakistani nuclear proliferation in three hypothetical 1985 scenarios:

- (1) a Sino-Soviet (conventional) war;
- (2) a local limited war between India and Pakistan; and
- (3) general war.

FINDINGS

- 0 The Indian and Pakistani political-military leaderships not only share a consensus on the utility of nuclear weapons for their respective countries, they have also devoted much time to their development.

In India, the political leadership shared a consensus on the utility of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons were developed under Indira Gandhi's rule. Despite Gandhi's surprise electoral defeat in 1977, Prime Minister Desai continued India's nuclear program as did Gandhi when she returned to power in January 1980. In the same vein, there was no apparent opposition from India's military on the utility and/or development of nuclear weapons.

In Pakistan, there were apparent cleavages between political and military elites, but not on the issue of nuclear proliferation. Prime Minister Bhutto initiated the Pakistani nuclear program; and although he



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was overthrown in a military coup (and subsequently executed) by Zia, who established martial law, Pakistan's nuclear program continued unabated. In other words, while many issues contributed to cleavage between political and military elites in Pakistan, the development of a nuclear program was not one of them.

- o External and internal factors have provided the catalyst for nuclear proliferation in India and Pakistan.

In the case of India, two external factors--the PRC and Pakistan--provided the catalyst for proliferation; although, from India's perspective, the PRC posed the primary threat. During India's 1962, 1965, and 1971 conflicts with Pakistan, China, a nuclear power, always supported Pakistan in a highly visible manner (and U.S. arms were used by Pakistan in the 1965 war).

As Indo-Soviet tensions heated up between 1969-1971, India and the USSR drew closer together, particularly after Henry Kissinger's July 1971 visit to Peking. (The USSR and India signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation on August 9, 1971). During the Indo-Pakistani war in the fall of 1971, the PRC supplied arms to Islamabad (and the U.S. "tilted" toward Pakistan). This threat--Pakistan backed by a nuclear PRC--provided the impetus for India's May 1974 detonation.

In the case of Pakistan, one external and one internal factor provided the catalyst for proliferation. Once India exploded its nuclear weapon in May 1974, Pakistan had to counter this new external threat. In addition to this security concern, nuclear proliferation also seems to be closely tied to prestige; in particular, Pakistan wants to be the first nuclear power in the Muslim world. Zia has publicly noted that Pakistan's nuclear reactor is the first in the Muslim world, as is its first nuclear fuel enrichment plant. When Pakistan finally admits publicly to possessing nuclear weapons, it will in all likelihood be justified in terms of prestige (Muslim) as well as security.

- o The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has had the unintended catalytic effect of hastening India's and

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Pakistan's rush to acquire inventories of nuclear weapons and sophisticated means of delivery.

Both India and Pakistan have successfully manipulated their respective Soviet and U.S. patrons in order to acquire sophisticated arms and access to advanced science and technology. Even before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, after the surprise electoral defeat of Gandhi in 1977, the Soviets exhibited concern about their investment in India. The Indians played on these Soviet concerns and successfully negotiated a 250 million ruble loan at extraordinarily favorable terms (e.g., 20 years at 2.5 percent interest) for arms.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, on the other hand, stimulated Pakistan's drive to acquire sophisticated delivery systems. Pakistan's successful acquisition of the F-16 aircraft caused consternation in India; which, in turn, put the touch on the USSR for \$1.6 billion in arms for all three of its services (e.g., missile-fitted patrol boats, T-72 battle tanks, and MiG-23BM and MiG-25 aircraft).

In sum, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan triggered a local arms race that can be particularly destabilizing in light of local instabilities and nuclear weapons inventories.

- o Each country (India and Pakistan) perceives the other to have a production capability (since about 1980) of five nuclear weapons per year.

Whether or not each side is actually producing nuclear weapons cannot be documented by available open-source evidence. What can be documented, however, is that each side perceives the other to be producing enough enriched uranium and plutonium to produce, at a minimum, five nuclear weapons per year. As these perceptions relate to essential security interests of each state, it is quite plausible that each side is actively seeking to counter this perceived threat. If this assessment is correct, by 1985 each side should have inventories of approximately 25 nuclear weapons (coupled with sophisticated means of delivery).

SCENARIOS

1. A SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT

In a Sino-Soviet conventional conflict, India would, without doubt, politically support the USSR. Just as the USSR has supported India in the past (during the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war and the 1975 State of Emergency), India would reciprocate that support not only out of gratitude (witness India's actions when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan), but also because India perceives the PRC to be the main threat to its security.

India could (although not necessarily would) support the USSR militarily against the PRC. Presuming that Soviets could handle the PRC by themselves, India's support would probably remain at the political level. On the other hand, India's political support for the USSR (coupled with nuclear weapons inventories and sophisticated means of delivery by 1985) could provide a credible deterrent against other local states (read Pakistan) who might be tempted to assist the PRC. It could also significantly complicate U.S. planning in the Indian Ocean.

2. AN INDO-PAKISTANI LOCAL CONFLICT

The net effect of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has been to increase tensions between Pakistan and India, ignite a local arms race (indigenous in origin, but fueled in large part by outside sources), and stimulate nuclear proliferation. While India's political system has evidenced relative stability during the past fifteen years (a State of Emergency was declared in 1975) and consistent support from and for the the Soviet Union, Pakistan has evidenced domestic instability (military coup) and despite past support, the U.S. has acquired correspondingly little influence over the course of events in Pakistan. Because of sophisticated weapons in Pakistan's inventories, domestic instability and lack of U.S. influence, the nature of any future local war is likely to be more complex than earlier wars between India and Pakistan. It is not inconceivable that a future war could quickly escalate to a nuclear conflict.



3. A GENERAL WAR

India and Pakistan both adhere to an official policy of non-alignment: India since the inception of that movement in 1961; and Pakistan since it withdrew from CENTO in March 1979. The recent activities of both suggest that if a general war were to break out between the super-powers, India and Pakistan would make every effort to remain neutral. As long as each state's national security was not directly threatened, each would likely adhere to its non-aligned policy to justify a position of neutrality.

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SECTION 1
THE ROLE OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN IN SINO-SOVIET WAR
(NO ESCALATION TO GENERAL WAR)

If there have been any constants in international affairs since the end of World War II, U.S.-USSR competition certainly remains one, despite perturbations from cold war to detente back to a "new" cold war era. Similarly, Islamic-Hindu relations since Pakistan declared its independence from India have charted the course of Indo-Pakistani rivalry. Since the early 1960's, Sino-Indian and Sino-Soviet tensions have been added constants that further complicate relationships on the subcontinent. The basic factors of Sino-Indian/Soviet rivalry coupled with Indo-Pakistani animus have "determined," to a great extent, relationships on the subcontinent and will likely impact on future developments in the Indian Ocean.

1-1 THE PRC AND THE 1971 SOVIET-INDIAN TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP
AND COOPERATION

Soviet tensions with the PRC first became public at the 22nd CPSU Congress (October 1961) when Chou En-lai walked out in protest over Khrushchev's "de-Stalinization" speech. Although Soviet tensions with the PRC continued during the 1960's, evidence of changed military deployments along the eastern frontier only started to become apparent in 1968 with a Soviet buildup in Mongolia.

During 1968, Soviet interest in India also became evident. Between 25-31 January, Alexei Kosygin visited Indira Gandhi for extended meetings in Delhi, where both agreed to increase Indo-Soviet economic cooperation. Only days later, in early February 1968, Admiral Gorshkov paid a visit to India's East and West Coast naval bases. Although his request for Soviet basing rights were refused (as was his suggestion for joint naval maneuvers), Soviet-Indian naval cooperation was increased (e.g., the USSR would provide India with four submarines, and train Indian crews).¹

¹Sunday Telegraph (London) (February 25, 1968).

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Also, at the end of March, the first Soviet warships ever to visit India appeared at Madras and Bombay; and on April 1, it was announced that three Petya class destroyer escorts were to go to India while Indian crews were to train in the USSR.² In sum, Soviet economic and military interest in India became quite apparent during 1968.

The years 1969-1971, which were critical years in Sino-Soviet and Sino-U.S. relations, also had long-standing reverberations on the Indian subcontinent. After the outbreak of fighting between the USSR and PRC along the Ussuri River in March and August 1969, the Soviets began a concerted military buildup along the eastern frontier. Between 1969-1971, Soviet deployments increased from 15 to 45 divisions (which remain to this day) and Marshal Tolubko of the Strategic Rocket Forces was transferred to the Far East to build up Soviet rocket forces there. At least twice during this period (in August 1969 and July 1970), Soviet officials, in soundings with U.S. officials, indicated they were "contemplating" preemption of PRC nuclear establishments.³ Needless to say, the U.S. spurned both Soviet overtures.

During the same period, President Nixon and Henry Kissinger were actively (and secretly) seeking diplomatic "channels" to Peking in order to counter the USSR and terminate the Vietnam conflict. After two years of extensive diplomacy, two channels were finally established in 1970: the "Romanian Channel" and the "Yahya (or Pakistani) Channel." Since the Chinese preferred the Pakistani channel, fearing KGB penetration of Romania, the U.S. was forced to rely on Pakistan as long as it put a premium on its Peking policy. In July 1971, Kissinger secretly visited

²Adam Clymer, "Indian and Soviet Navies Seen Courting Cooperation," Baltimore Sun (April 2, 1968).

³See respectively, Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), p. 183; and John Newhouse, Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973), pp. 188-189.

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Peking (going from Pakistan) and stunned the world with the announcement that Richard Nixon would soon visit the PRC.⁴

While the upcoming Nixon visit and resulting Shanghai Communique (February 1972) would set the course of Sino-U.S. relations for the next decade, it also reverberated on the Indian subcontinent. U.S. desire for closer cooperation with the PRC and reliance on Pakistan (both India's traditional enemies) not only put India and the U.S. on a collision course, but it also "drove" the USSR and India closer together.

During March 2-9, 1969, while the Ussuri crisis was erupting between the USSR and PRC, Admiral Gorshkov again paid a visit to India. Gorshkov's discussions with Gandhi and External Affairs Minister Singh focused on the question of more Soviet arms to India. As noted earlier, the major catalyst in Indo-Soviet relations appears to have been Henry Kissinger's presence in Peking in July 1971. In what Time magazine termed "a counter-measure to the stunning U.S. move to Peking," and what Moscow Radio called a "considerable blow to imperialist schemes, particularly in the Indian Ocean area," a Soviet-Indian Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was hurriedly negotiated and signed on August 9, 1971.⁵ Gromyko's visit had been announced only forty-eight hours earlier; and less than 24 hours after his arrival the treaty was signed. India's Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was only the second such treaty signed by the USSR; its first was with Egypt in March 1971.

The forms of cooperation engendered by the 1971 treaty apparently included political, military and long-term scientific and technical (S&T) cooperation. Hence, when Indo-Pakistan tensions were building during 1971 and an estimated eight million refugees from Pakistan appeared in India, Gandhi received political support from Moscow. On September 29, 1971,

⁴For a more complete discussion of these events, see Jeffrey Simon, Cohesion and Dissension in Eastern Europe: Six Crises (New York: Praeger, 1983), pp. 100-103.

⁵Time (23 August 1971); and Moscow Radio Peace & Progress, -1330 GMT (August 11, 1971). Foreign Broadcast Information Service, (FBIS), Daily Report (DR), Soviet Union (SU) (August 12, 1971).

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India and the USSR signed a joint appeal for political solution of the East Pakistan problem and return of the refugees.⁶ When full-scale war erupted at the end of the year after India aided Bengali rebels in East Pakistan, the USSR again supported India. During this critical period, the U.S., needing to keep open its "Yahya Channel," tilted toward Pakistan. Since this juncture, superpower political relations in Hindustan have remained virtually unaltered.

1-2 INDO-SOVIET MILITARY COOPERATION

Although Soviet-Indian military relations also evidenced new closeness after the 1971 treaty, it is difficult to determine how much of the subsequent military cooperation was due to the treaty and/or to India's evolving perception of "new" external threats. For example, between April 3-10, 1972, Admiral Gorshkov again visited Delhi and the Vishapatnam naval base, which he agreed to assist in repairing.⁷ Then during the period of July 7-18, 1973, shortly after the U.S. agreed to sell advanced arms to Iran, Indian Defense Minister Jagjivan Ram went on an arms shopping mission to Moscow, where he argued that India needed more arms because he felt U.S. arms to Iran would flow to Pakistan.⁸ Succumbing, in part, to these Indian pressures coupled with the desire to deepen relations with India, Brezhnev paid his first to India visit in 12 years. During Brezhnev's November 27-30, 1973 visit, the CPSU General Secretary agreed to:

- (1) maintain long-term cooperation between the two countries;
- (2) supply (in a secret and verbal agreement) Soviet arms to India; and

⁶Reuters, September 29, 1971.

⁷Moscow TASS, 1820 GMT (April 12, 1972). FBIS, DR, SU (April 13, 1972), p. 813.

⁸Washington Post (July 6, 1973), p. 16.

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(3) deepen economic and technical cooperation.⁹

Brezhnev also made note of so-called "special relations" between the two countries.

Evidence of close Soviet-Indian military cooperation was apparent during 1974. Admiral Kohli, Commander in Chief of Indian Naval Forces, twice visited Gorshkov in Moscow in January and October; and G. Narain, Indian Defense Secretary, twice visited Grechko in Moscow in April and December.¹⁰ While Soviet-Indian relations deepened, India evidenced concern with U.S. and Pakistani activities. In February 1974, when the U.S. announced plans for a base at Diego Garcia, India indicated displeasure and portrayed the base as a threat to its security.¹¹ The same themes were portrayed by India's media during CENTO's "MID-LINK-74" naval exercise. Hosted by Pakistan between November 19-30, the Indian media noted this was the largest exercise ever held in the Indian Ocean and that two nuclear submarines and an aircraft carrier (with dual capable aircraft) participated in the exercise.¹² In sum, India, like the USSR, portrayed U.S./Pakistani activities as a threat to India's and the Indian Ocean's security. During the same period, the Soviets were making

⁹Lewis M. Simons, "India Gives Soviets Key Role in Nation's Economic Planning," Washington Post (December 1, 1973), p. 1.

¹⁰Krasnaya Zvezda (January 16, 1974), p. 1. FBIS, DR, SU (January 18, 1974), p. J1; "Guest from India," Krasnaya Zvezda (October 16, 1974), p. 3. FBIS, DR, SU (October 24, 1974), p. J3; Krasnaya Zvezda (April 26, 1974), p. 4. FBIS, DR, SU (May 3, 1974), p. J1. FBIS, DR, SU (May 3, 1974), p. J1; Moscow Domestic Service, 2130 GMT (December 18, 1974). FBIS, DR, SU (December 20, 1974), p. J1.

¹¹Bernard Weinraub, "U.S. Plan to Set Up Island Base is Chilling Relations with India," New York Times (February 8, 1974), p. 49.

¹²Delhi General Overseas Service, 1010 GMT (November 22, 1974). FBIS, DR, South Asia (SA) (November 22, 1974), p. U8.

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efforts to reward Pakistan for withdrawing from SEATO, recognizing the DRV and DRK, and quitting CENTO.¹³

1-3 INDO-SOVIET S&T COOPERATION AND INDIA'S NUCLEAR DETONATION -

The most important development during this period was India's first detonation of a nuclear device in May 1974. The questions of what assistance, if any, India acquired from the USSR, and the long-term potential effect on Pakistani proliferation

are, of course, critical issues. Although India, like Pakistan, did not sign the 1968 non-proliferation treaty (NPT), Prime Minister Gandhi, at a June 6, 1969 press conference, was still arguing that the

Indian Ocean must be regarded as a nuclear free zone...(adding) it is not Indian policy to produce the atom bomb (and) any threat will be dealt with by conventional weapons.¹⁴

During 1969-1971, when the USSR was clearly concerned about the PRC--even considering preemption--India was not only increasingly concerned about Pakistan but also about nuclear proliferation. It remains unclear how much, if any, Soviet long-term S&T assistance actually facilitated India's achievement of this goal. As noted above, the catalyst for the August 1971 Soviet-Indian treaty was Kissinger's July visit to Peking. During a September 1971 visit to Moscow, Gandhi signed a joint statement which specifically "expressed satisfaction in new forms of co-operation such as space research (and) peaceful use of nuclear energy."¹⁵

On August 17, 1972, India launched its own two-stage Centaur rocket (150 kilometers) from the Thumba rocket-launching station and publicly announced plans to develop its own satellite (to be put into orbit within

¹³Moscow Radio Peace and Progress, 1530 GMT (November 21, 1972). FBIS, DR, SU (November 22, 1972) pp. U8.

¹⁴Reuters (June 6, 1969).

¹⁵Reuters (September 29, 1971).

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the next few years) and its own missile and solid fuel technology.¹⁶ Then on February 21, 1973, Prime Minister Gandhi (who also held India's space portfolio) noted that India recently launched an indigenously developed two stage Rohini 560 rocket from the Sriharikota launching station.¹⁷ While these activities appear to have been the result of indigenous Indian activities, the first clear evidence of joint Soviet-Indian space and S&T cooperation was publicly revealed by Leonid Brezhnev during his November 1973 visit to India. The CPSU General Secretary publicly noted:

We are thinking of attaching to our cooperation in the economy and science and technology a stable and long-term nature, to determine the main trends of its development, at least for the next 15 years...

The governments of our countries agreed on the launching of an Indian satellite by means of the Soviet carrier rocket. This agreement is symbolic...shows how great are the prospects of our contacts. This refers not only to outer space, but also to atomic power engineering, electronics, and many other spheres.¹⁸

Shortly after Brezhnev's visit, Soviet scientists appeared in Delhi to work on India's first space satellite.¹⁹ In summary, although Soviet S&T assistance to India appeared to be unrelated to India's actual May 1974 detonation, once India achieved its nuclear breakthrough, the USSR appeared willing to facilitate its space effort.

In contrast, India's detonation of a nuclear device had negative consequences on its relations with many other powers. Henry Kissinger

¹⁶Delhi Domestic Service, 1530 GMT (August 17, 1972). FBIS, DR, SA (August 18, 1972), p. 4.

¹⁷Delhi Domestic Service, 0830 GMT (February 21, 1973). FBIS, DR, SA (February 22, 1973, p. 1.

¹⁸Brezhnev speech, Moscow TASS, 1552 GMT (November 27, 1973). FBIS, DR, SU (November 27, 1973), p. J9.

¹⁹Moscow TASS, 0816 GMT (January 18, 1974). FBIS, DR, SU (January 18, 1974), p. J2.

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visited Delhi in October 1974 to express U.S. concern for its effect on Pakistani proliferation.²⁰ In February 1975, Canada cancelled a permit for the export of nuclear equipment to India.²¹ U.S. and Canadian actions, however, did not deter India which continued to further develop indigenous, and to seek substitute sources of, nuclear technology. In an April 28, 1975 Delhi Atomic Energy Report, note was made of the "successful" May 1974 underground nuclear explosion. The report also referred to the fact that nuclear fuel bunches were being produced indigenously, for the first time, at Hyderabad and that Unit I of the Madras atomic power project was completed.²² India also found substitute sources for its nuclear development in France. The Bharat Heavy Plates and Vessels (BHPV), Ltd. (an Indian company that builds submarines and is active in the nuclear field) which builds parts for heat exchangers for the heavy water plants under construction in Tutcorin and Kota, and for the major part of the fast breeder reactor for Kalapakkam near Madras, sent two Indian engineers to France to be trained in breeder reactor technology.²³

India's justification for detonating its nuclear device was straightforward: the PRC posed a threat to India. On April 7, 1975, India accused the PRC (who publicly criticized India's detonation) of raising the "spectre of nuclear blackmail by India" to sow dissent between India and her neighbors (read Pakistan).²⁴ The April 26, 1975, Delhi

²⁰Kissinger appealed to Gandhi not to export any nuclear technology and argued that ever since the May 1974 nuclear test, Pakistani President Bhutto had been arguing that Pakistan must also seek to develop a nuclear program for "peaceful" purposes to match India. "U.S. Shifts View of India's Role," Washington Post (October 29, 1974), pp. 1, 16.

²¹Reuters, 1162 GMT (February 19, 1975). FBIS, DR, SA (February 21, 1975).

²²Bombay PTI, 1229 GMT (April 26, 1975). FBIS, DR, SA (April 30, 1975), p. U2.

²³Bombay PTI, 0605 GMT (January 11, 1976). FBIS, DR, SA (January 12, 1976), p. S4.

²⁴Delhi ISI, 0545 GMT (April 7, 1975). FBIS, DR, SA (April 9, 1975), p. U1.

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Atomic Energy Report also noted that its Garibidanur seismic array had detected a PRC nuclear test on June 17, 1974.²⁵ Finally, at a January 27, 1976 press conference, Prime Minister Gandhi claimed:

those governments critical of India's peaceful nuclear explosion are critical of whatever India does. Nobody criticizes China for making nuclear bombs.²⁶

Hence, the PRC "threat" was portrayed to have been a prime motive for India's nuclear detonation.

In the same vein, the Soviet Union apparently perceived Sino-American cooperation in the post Shanghai communique period as more threatening to the USSR than India's nuclear proliferation. Soviet-Indian military and S&T cooperation not only remained on track after India's 1974 detonation, it deepened perceptibly. Between February 24-27, 1975, Defense Minister Grechko visited Delhi, bringing not only Gorshkov (Soviet-Indian naval cooperation had been apparent since 1968), but also Kutakhov (signifying a new interest in Soviet-Indian air defense/air force cooperation).²⁷

1-4 POLITICAL TURMOIL AND SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN INDIA

During the summer of 1975, when Gandhi declared a "State of Emergency" in India, the Soviet Union, as during the Indo-Pakistani war, politically supported her actions. In apparent reciprocation, Gandhi noted:

"(the USSR) has stood by us during times of trouble and difficulty. The only thing they have asked for in return is friendship."²⁸

²⁵See footnote 22 above.

²⁶Delhi Domestic Service, 1530 GMT (January 27, 1976). FBIS, DR, SA (January 28, 1976), p. S3.

²⁷Moscow TASS, 1321 GMT (February 25, 1975). FBIS, DR, SU (February 25, 1975), p. J1.

²⁸Delhi Domestic Service, 1530 GMT (January 27, 1976). FBIS, DR, SA (January 28, 1976), p. S3.

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During a June 8-13, 1976, visit to Moscow, Gandhi also acknowledged Soviet space exploration assistance to India and then signed a declaration to further strengthen relations between the two countries.²⁹ (In fact, between November 22-30, the Indian Chief of Staff visited Moscow for talks with Kutakhov and Ustinov.)³⁰ In sum, Soviet-Indian military/space cooperation appeared to be unhampered by India's nuclear proliferation, in part, because of their joint perception of the PRC as an increasingly dangerous threat. While the U.S. and Canada, among others, were clearly concerned about India's nuclear developments, the French (and apparently the Soviets) were quite willing to facilitate India's search for substitute sources and desire to develop an indigenous nuclear technology.

When Prime Minister Gandhi was defeated at the polls in March 1977, many, including the Soviets, were caught by surprise.³¹ In addition, when Morarji Desai (while being sworn in as Premier) noted that "India will seek [an] equal position toward all countries," the Soviets apparently became quite concerned and engaged in active diplomatic maneuvers to ensure their investment in the subcontinent.³²

Between April 25-27, 1977, Foreign Minister Gromyko visited Delhi and agreed to extend a 250 million ruble loan to India at more favorable terms (e.g., 20 years at 2.5 percent) than the Soviets had ever extended before. (At this point in time, the USSR was India's only source of heavy

²⁹Moscow TASS, 1230 GMT (June 11, 1976). FBIS, DR, SU (June 14, 1976), p. 31.

³⁰Krasnaya Zvezda (November 23, 1976), p. 3. FBIS, DR, SU (December 1, 1976), p. 31.

³¹KGB political analysts were withdrawn from India, presumably because they had incorrectly advised the USSR on the Indian election. See Daily Telegraph (London) (April 13, 1977), p. 4.

³²Wall Street Journal (March 25, 1977). Desai had earlier indicated strong reservations about the August 9, 1971 treaty. Hong Kong AFP, 1143 GMT (April 25, 1977). FBIS, DR, SA (April 25, 1977), p. 54.

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water; and it remains unclear if this "stick" was ever used as leverage.)³³ Shortly thereafter, following in the footsteps of Gornshkov and Kutakhov, General Pavlovskiy, Chief of Soviet Ground Forces, visited India (between May 23-28), also apparently for the first time. His talks with Defense Secretary Jagjivan Ram confirmed "growing cooperation" and involved discussion of the "exchange of service personnel for training at defense establishments."³⁴ On September 1-2, 1977, General T. N. Raina, Indian Army Chief of Staff, visited Moscow to meet with Ustinov, Orgarkov and Pavlovskiy.³⁵

Then between October 21-27, 1977, Desai visited Moscow where he signed a Joint Declaration committing India to a long-term program of economic cooperation ending in 1990. In sum, the Soviets, "shaken" by Gandhi's defeat, engaged in extensive efforts to deepen economic and broaden military cooperation to keep Soviet-Indian relations intact. (India was building MiG-21's under Soviet license and its navy was mostly Soviet-built.)³⁶ Soviet Vice Admiral N. Yasakov on December 22, 1977, even went so far as to suggest that "it will be worthwhile for India's navy to go nuclear," hinting that the USSR would share its technical expertise in sophisticated weaponry for India's F-class submarines.³⁷

Despite these Soviet efforts, the Indian press suggested on the one hand that Desai desired to diversify the sources of India's arms acquisitions in order to further guarantee India's indigenous arms production

³³Delhi Domestic Service, 0830 GMT (April 27, 1977). FBIS, DR, SA (April 27, 1977), pp. S3-4.

³⁴Hong Kong AFP, 1620 GMT (May 12, 1977), p. 1. FBIS, DR, SA (May 13, 1977), p. S2.

³⁵Krasnaya Zvezda (September 2, 1977), p. 1. FBIS, DR, SU (September 6, 1977).

³⁶Mohan Ram, "India Acts to Improve Its Military," Christian Science Monitor (July 13, 1977), p. 5.

³⁷Delhi Patriot (December 22, 1977), p. 1. FBIS, DR, SA (December 30, 1977), p. S2.

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capability.³⁸ Indigenously was also indicated by Defense Minister Jagjivan Ram when he announced on September 4, 1977, that India wanted to produce its own submarines and was seeking to negotiate with several unnamed countries.³⁹ On the other hand, despite this goal, India's relations with the U.S. did not improve after Gandhi's electoral defeat. On May 23, 1977, Prime Minister Desai's External Affairs Minister, A. B. Vajpayee, made note of two nagging problems with the U.S:

- (1) the U.S. was allegedly balking on its contracted agreement to supply India with enriched uranium (for the Tarapore reactor); and
- (2) the U.S. was continuing to arm Pakistan.⁴⁰

The Indian media portrayed the U.S. conditions for enriched uranium shipments as the equivalent of "nuclear blackmail," while Desai's position (compared to Gandhi's) on nuclear proliferation did not change.⁴¹ The new Prime Minister justified India's refusal to sign a non-proliferation treaty claiming the treaty was merely an effort of nuclear powers "to prevent developing nations from developing nuclear energy sources of their own."⁴²

1-5 INDIAN-SOVIET RELATIONS IN THE PRE-AFGHANISTAN INVASION PERIOD

During 1978-1979 (up to the December 27, 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan), Soviet-Indian relations evidenced continued, uninterrupted closeness. Joint aviation cooperation was apparent on the military side:

³⁸Mohan Ram, op. cit.

³⁹Hong Kong AFP, 0757 GMT (September 4, 1977). FBIS, DR, SA (September 7, 1977), p. S3.

⁴⁰Delhi ISI, 0835 GMT (May 23, 1977). FBIS, DR, SA (May 24, 1977), pp. S3-4.

⁴¹Editorial: "Blackmail," (Delhi) National Herald (May 18, 1977), p. 5. FBIS, DR, SA (May 24, 1977), p. S3.

⁴²Ibid.

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Soviet Marshal of Aviation P. S. Kutakhov again visited India (between March 28 and April 1, 1978) for discussions with Air Chief Marshal H. Moolgavkar.⁴³ Then during September 1979, Indian Air Chief Marshal H. Latif visited Kutakhov in Moscow.⁴⁴

More important was evidence of close joint cooperation in space exploration and S&T activities: On March 8, 1978, the Soviets signed another contract and agreed to supply India with a second lot (70 tons) of heavy water in 1978. (During 1976, the USSR delivered 55 tons of its first lot.)⁴⁵ On May 14, 1978, U. R. Rao, Director of India's Space Research Center, claimed that

...close cooperation with Soviet specialists in the field of outer space...has enabled Indian scientists, engineers and technicians...to design, manufacture and assemble three new satellites.⁴⁶

On August 18, 1978, it was publicly announced that the long-term S&T cooperation program, which had been discussed by Desai in Moscow during October 1977, included Soviet technology transfer to India. The program included cooperation on a compensation basis and introduced new technology and improved existing technology.⁴⁷

On September 11-18, 1978, Minister of External Affairs A. B. Vajpayee visited Moscow for talks which "opened up new prospects in S&T cooperation."⁴⁸ During November 1978, it was publicly announced that the

⁴³Krasnaya Zvezda (March 28, 1978), p. 3. FBIS, DR, SU (March 31, 1978), p. J1.

⁴⁴"Guest from India," Krasnaya Zvezda (September 5, 1979), p. 3. FBIS, DR, SU (September 12, 1979), p. D6.

⁴⁵Prime Minister Morarji Desai statement, Delhi ISI, 1519 GMT (March 9, 1978). FBIS, DR, SA (March 10, 1978), p. S4.

⁴⁶Moscow TASS, 1013 GMT (May 14, 1978). FBIS, DR, SU (May 17 1978), p. J4.

⁴⁷Delhi Domestic Service, 0830 GMT (August 18, 1978). FBIS, DR, SA (August 23, 1978), p. S3.

⁴⁸Joint Communique, Delhi ISI, 1434 GMT (September 18, 1978). FBIS, DR, SU (September 19, 1978), pp. J1-4.

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USSR would provide gratis a carrier rocket and the launching complex for India's second space satellite (the USSR had also launched India's first satellite on April 19, 1975).⁴⁹ From March 9-15, 1979, Alexei Kosygin visited Delhi where he signed a 10 to 15-year S&T cooperation agreement. The joint communique noted the "great significance of the Soviet-led agreement on the peaceful use of atomic energy signed on January 22, 1979" and agreed on further reciprocal measures, including deliveries of "certain commodities" in joint atomic energy cooperation.⁵⁰ When Premier Desai visited Moscow during June 10-13, 1979, the Soviets agreed in principle to supply a new batch of heavy water for India's Rajasthan Atomic Power Plant.⁵¹

Despite the apparent closeness in Soviet-Indian military and S&T relations, India, on the one hand, persisted in its efforts to broaden its sources of technology and to ensure India's independence through self-sufficiency. Defense Minister Jagjivan Ram, on March 16, 1978, held discussions with Swedish, West German, French, Italian, and Dutch shipyards for possible construction of Indian submarines; and in November, he informed the Parliament that an agreement with the U.K. had been reached for the acquisition of Jaguar aircraft (to be available in 1979).⁵² During 1979, India's new Defense Minister Subramaniam continued to underline the importance of an indigenous and balanced navy because of recent

⁴⁹Moscow TASS, 2137 GMT (November 3, 1978). FBIS, DR, SU (November 7, 1978), p. U2.

⁵⁰"Soviet-Indian Joint Communique," Pravda (March 16, 1979), pp. 1,4. FBIS, DR, SU (March 21, 1979), pp. D1-4.

⁵¹Delhi Domestic Service, 1530 GMT (June 13, 1979). FBIS, DR, SA (June 14, 1979), p. S2.

⁵²Delhi Domestic Service, 0830 GMT (March 16, 1978). FBIS, DR, SA (March 17, 1978), p. S4; and Delhi Domestic Service, 0730 GMT (November 22, 1978). FBIS, DR, SA (November 22, 1978), p. S12.

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developments in Pakistan, Iran and the Gulf states.⁵³ Toward the end of the month, it was announced that India would build several warships and modern submarines, and would acquire modern aircraft for its lone aircraft carrier (Asia's only carrier), the Vikrant.⁵⁴

On the other hand, India's relations with the U.S. still remained distant, if not clouded. During a June 1978 visit to the U.S., Prime Minister Desai held talks with President Carter regarding India's stand on nuclear proliferation and non-alignment policy. Although Desai claimed the U.S. understood his position, Indira Gandhi criticized Desai's promise that India would not continue nuclear explosions even for "peaceful purposes."⁵⁵ Despite efforts to improve relations with the U.S., the same long-standing irritants remained: undelivered U.S. supplies of enriched uranium, close U.S. relations with the PRC, and U.S. arms shipments to Pakistan. In November 1978, Desai informed the Parliament that he had requested 19.8 tons of enriched uranium from the U.S., in addition to an earlier request for 16.8 tons, noting that up to that point nothing had been forthcoming.⁵⁶

Then, during March 1979, in retaliation for the U.S. suspension of enriched uranium for Tarapur, the USSR volunteered to build India an atomic power plant (six times the size of the U.S. built Tarapur project).⁵⁷ Rather than increase dependence on the USSR, India rejected the Soviet offer and in May 1979, Dr. H. N. Sethna, Chairman of India's AEC, made reference to India's

⁵³Delhi General Overseas Service, 1000 GMT (November 6, 1979). FBIS, DR, SA (November 7, 1979), p. S5.

⁵⁴Mohan Ram, "India's Growing Navy Gets Into Deeper Waters," Christian Science Monitor (November 23, 1979), p. 7.

⁵⁵Delhi Domestic Service, 0830 GMT (June 17, 1978). FBIS, DR, SA (June 19, 1978), p. S2.

⁵⁶Delhi Domestic Service, 0830 (November 22, 1978). FBIS, DR, SA (November 22, 1978), p. S10.

⁵⁷Hong Kong AFP, 1152 GMT (March 21, 1979). FBIS, DR, SA (March 22, 1979), p. S5.

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vigorous attempts to develop indigenously a substitute fuel for enriched uranium...[saying] this would end dependence on foreign sources once and for all.⁵⁸

In June, Prime Minister Desai continued to express confidence about India becoming self-reliant in the nuclear field: "We have succeeded in everything we have tried in the past. In this also, we will succeed."⁵⁹ In sum, despite the change in Indian leadership, India's relations remained close with the USSR, distant with the U.S., and its policies of indigenouslyness and efforts to find substitute sources of technology and arms to ensure India's independence remained unaltered during this period.

1-6 SOVIET "FENCE MENDING" FOLLOWING THE INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN

When President Carter, following the course set by the 1972 Shanghai Communique, announced in December 1978 that the U.S. would extend diplomatic recognition to the PRC, the USSR and India were not pleased. In addition, when the USSR invaded Afghanistan on December 27, 1979, and the U.S. and NATO allies imposed economic sanctions on the USSR, India's response was to withhold its criticism of the USSR and expressed concerns about for the U.S. arms that would soon flow to Pakistan.

Prime Minister Desai, in immediate response to the Soviet invasion, called in Soviet Ambassador Yuriy M. Vorontsov on December 31, 1979, to express his "deep concern" and hope that "Soviet troops withdraw from Afghanistan as soon as possible."⁶⁰ The U.S. ambassador was simultaneously called to the Ministry of External Affairs in connection with the reported lifting of the embargo on arms supplies to Pakistan. India expressed "grave concern" over this matter and pointed out that "the

⁵⁸Delhi Domestic Service, 0830 GMT (May 17, 1979). FBIS, DR, SA (May 18, 1979), p. S1.

⁵⁹Delhi ISI. Diplomatic Information Service, 0832 GMT (June 2, 1979). FBIS, DR, SA (June 5, 1979), p. S1.

⁶⁰Statement issued by Ministry of External Affairs, Delhi ISI Diplomatic Informations Service, 1706 GMT (December 31, 1979). FBIS, DR, SA (January 2, 1980), pp. S15-16.

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supply of arms in the past to Pakistan has invariably led to an increase of tension on South Asia."⁶¹ In sum, India perceived U.S. activities (e.g., arms to Pakistan) to be as much of a threat to its security as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Only weeks later, during January 1980, Indira Gandhi was returned to power in India's general election. The new Prime Minister's position on the USSR and U.S. did not waver from Desai's stand. In a January 16, 1980, interview, Gandhi noted that although India did not support the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the U.S. arms that would flow to Pakistan would be used against India and thereby created a dangerous situation to the region.⁶²

The Soviets, apparently concerned about the effect of their actions in Afghanistan, immediately launched a fence-mending mission to India. Between February 12-14, 1980, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko visited Delhi. During the discussions, there were apparently "differences in perception" on how to defuse the situation in South Asia.⁶³ Undeterred, the Soviets continued their efforts to repair the damage, and their method was not unlike those used when they were caught by surprise by Gandhi's ouster in the 1977 general election. First, the Soviet media reiterated the theme of the PRC-Pakistani (and U.S. arms to both) threat to Indian security.⁶⁴ Gandhi appeared to be receptive to the Soviet position. In a March 3, 1980 Le Matin interview she argued that since the rebels in Afghanistan were armed by Pakistan (which "participates with the U.S. and PRC in a very close anti-Soviet entente"), the Soviets had "no

⁶¹Ibid., p. S16.

⁶²Delhi Domestic Service, 1530 GMT (January 16, 1980). FBIS, DR, SA (January 17, 1980), pp. S9-10.

⁶³Delhi Domestic Service, 1530 GMT (February 13, 1980). FBIS, DR, SA (February 14, 1980), pp. S7-8.

⁶⁴Moscow TASS, 1113 GMT (February 22, 1980). FBIS, DR, SU (February 22, 1980), pp. D5.

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alternative" to their actions, adding that U.S. actions in the Indian Ocean constitute a "danger to India in the region."⁶⁵

Second, the Soviets rendered military (and S&T) assistance at very favorable terms "to meet India's strategic needs."⁶⁶ At the end of March 1980, the Soviets signed a three-year agreement with India on S&T cooperation in solar energy and power metallurgy, including lasers and semiconductors.⁶⁷ The Soviets again offered to provide assistance to India for the construction of a nuclear power plant, and on May 27, 1980, concluded a weapons deal worth over \$1.6 billion for all three of India's military services.⁶⁸ Allegedly India would acquire AA and SS missiles, missile-fitted naval patrol boats, and 100 T-72 tanks (with 600 more to be produced under license indigenously). The Soviets, as in 1977, extended very favorable terms to India: a 17-year credit at 2.5 percent interest.⁶⁹ Finally, during July, discussions were initiated for India's acquisition (and later indigenous production) of MiG-23B aircraft to replace obsolete Sukhoi 7 (SU-7) tactical aircraft.⁷⁰ These developments were further advanced during a December 8-11, 1980 Leonid

⁶⁵(Paris) Le Matin (March 3, 1980), p. 12. FBIS, DR, SA (March 7, 1980), pp. S10-12.

⁶⁶(Delhi) Patriot (February 12, 1980). FBIS, DR, SA (February 13, 1980), p. D4.

⁶⁷Delhi Domestic Service, -0240 GMT (March 29, 1980). FBIS, DR, SA (April 3, 1980), p. E10.

⁶⁸(Karachi) Morning News (April 9, 1980), p. 1 FBIS, DR, SA (April 25, 1980), p. F2.

⁶⁹Hong Kong AFP, 1841 GMT (May 27, 1980). FBIS, DR, SA (May 28, 1980), p. E1; and Dusko Doder, "Soviets and India Set \$1.6 Billion Arms Agreement," Washington Post (May 29, 1980), p. 1.

⁷⁰Since India was already producing MiG-21 bis aircraft the MiG-23 allowed for standardization of many parts. (Bombay) The Times of India (July 14, 1980), p. 1.

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Brezhnev visit to Delhi where four agreements--on S&T cooperation, trade between 1981 and 1985, educational and scientific exchanges, and cinematography cooperation--were signed. The joint communique totally ignored the issue of Afghanistan, and Indian press reports claimed that the Soviets had promised to supply India with "the latest equipment (MiG-25 Foxbats), some still on the drawing board."⁷¹

In conjunction with their activities in India, the Soviets simultaneously pursued a propaganda campaign highlighting the dangers posed by U.S. (Pakistani and PRC) activities to Indian security and encouraging India to make the Indian Ocean a nuclear-free zone. During a July 1980 visit of Indian Communist Party leaders to Moscow, Andrei Kirilenko and Boris Ponomarev (with Diego Garcia in mind) discussed the issue of "demilitarizing the Indian Ocean [arguing] the elimination of all foreign military bases...as an indispensable condition for this."⁷² The Soviet media also made the point that:

In sending nuclear-powered cruisers and giant aircraft carriers there (e.g., Indian Ocean), Washington, in the fall of 1971, is pursuing a perfectly definite aim--suppressing the national liberation movements in the countries of the Indian Ocean basin and intimidating the peoples living there.⁷³

Indian officialdom appeared to share the Soviet view. On August 5, 1980, External Affairs Minister P. V. Narashimha Rao expressed:

...particular worry about the expansion of the Diego Garcia base...(adding) India should devote greater

⁷¹Moscow TASS, 1559 GMT (December 16, 1980). FBIS, DR, SU (December 17, 1980), p. D2; and Hong Kong AFP, 0923 GMT (December 13, 1980). FBIS, DR, SA (December 17, 1980), p. E4.

⁷²"Meeting at the CPSU Central Committee," Pravda (July 30, 1980), p. 2. FBIS, DR, SU (August 5, 1980), p. D8.

⁷³A. Fialkovskiy, "A Reliable Compass: The Soviet-Indian Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation Is Nine Years Old," Izvestiya (August 8, 1980), p. 5. FBIS, DR, SU (August 13, 1980), p. D4.

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attention to the modernization of its navy to safeguard its security.⁷⁴

In addition, during Brezhnev's December visit to India, Gandhi, dwelling on the situation in the Indian Ocean:

denounced the escalation of foreign military presence in that basin...(and) demanded that the entire Indian Ocean should become a zone of peace.⁷⁵

In summary, the Soviets, through very careful orchestration of political, military and S&T policy not only appeared to ensure that their relations with India remained on an even keel after the invasion of Afghanistan, but also actually appeared to acquire some political capital as a result of their action. By stressing the "new" dangers to India engendered by:

- (1) U.S. arms to Pakistan;
- (2) U.S. and Pakistan's closer relations with China; and
- (3) U.S. bases (and nuclear carriers) in the Indian Ocean,

the Soviets not only found a receptive ear but also support for Soviet policy among Delhi's political leadership. By extending military aid (as evident in Table 1.1 below), the Soviets also appeared to acquire an even greater foothold in all of India's three military services.

The Indians, on the other hand, apparently saw the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as an opportunity to acquire, at favorable terms, first-line equipment from the Soviets. In addition, they apparently saw an opportunity to shortcut the otherwise long R&D times required for their S&T developments and to circumvent the endemic, nagging problems India was experiencing with the U.S. over enriched uranium sources.

⁷⁴Delhi Domestic Service, 1530 GMT (August 5, 1980). FBIS, DR, SA (August 6, 1980), p. E1.

⁷⁵Moscow TASS, 1559 GMT (December 16, 1980). FBIS, DR, SU (December 17, 1980), p. D2.

Table 1.1. Soviet Equipment in India

	<u>1979</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>
<u>NAVAL</u>				
F-Class Subs	8	8	8	8
Petya II Frigates	10	12	12	9
Nanuchka Corvettes w/SSM & SAM	3	4	3 (4*)	3 (2*)
OSA I/II FAC(M) w/Styx SSM	16	16	16	16
Natya Ocean Minesweepers	2	4	6	6
Polnocny LCT	6	6	6 (6*)	6 (6*)
Kashin Destroyers w/4 Styx SSM, SA-N-4 SAM	0	0	2 (2*)	2
<u>AIR FORCE</u>				
MiG-21's (PF, M, bis, U)	252	252	300	300
MiG-25 Recce	0	0 (5*)	0 (8*)	8
MiG-23 (BM, UM)	0	0	10 (75*)	10 (75*)
<u>ARMY</u>				
T-54/56	900	950	950	950
T 72		70	170	78 (130*)

*On order

Source: The Military Balance, 1979-80; 1980-81; 1981-82; 1982-83

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1-7 INDIA'S NUCLEAR AND SPACE ACTIVITIES GAIN MOMENTUM

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and resulting U.S. (and PRC) arms flow to Pakistan did not alter India's traditional threat perceptions. In a January 10, 1980 interview in reference to the U.S. arms-flowing to Pakistan, Indira Gandhi noted that "these weapons (in Pakistan's hands) have always been used against us."⁷⁶ Also in reference to U.S. defense secretary Harold Brown's statement of possible military cooperation between the U.S. and PRC, Gandhi added:

...we believe...this (Sino-U.S.) alliance will be very dangerous for us and for the entire region... because China is a threat to us. China has expansionist intentions.⁷⁷

In response to a question about the possibility of Pakistan acquiring a so-called "Islamic Bomb," Gandhi noted:

We do not fear any of this. But I think that a country without an industrial base and one where the government is not very stable, it is very dangerous that such a country possess an atomic bomb.⁷⁸

In addition to having the apparent effect of drawing the USSR and India closer together, the invasion of Afghanistan--which seemed to act as a catalyst for India's quest for indigenous arms production, modernization and buildup of its three services--created stress between the U.S. and India over India's nuclear policy (e.g., development of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicle technology). Indira Gandhi, in a January 17, 1980 interview, noted that while

we do not believe in producing atom bombs...we should have the freedom in developing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.⁷⁹

⁷⁶Paris Domestic Service, 1810 GMT (January 10, 1980). FBIS, DR, SA (January 11, 1980), p. S11.

⁷⁷Ibid., p. S13.

⁷⁸Ibid., p. S14.

⁷⁹Delhi Domestic Service, 0830 GMT (January 1, 1980). FBIS, DR, SA (January 17, 1980), p. S10.

[REDACTED]

In March, External Affairs Minister Gonsalves was in the U.S. attempting to get shipments of the withheld enriched uranium for Tarapur. The U.S. condition—that India not detonate a nuclear explosion before the U.S. sent enriched uranium to India—was apparently unacceptable. On March 15, a spokesman for the Indian External Affairs Ministry specifically noted that

whether India will have explosions or implusions for the country's development and other peaceful purposes will be decided in view of the national interest.⁸⁰

India may have been keeping its options open, in part, because its Institute of Defense Studies and Analyses had recently published a report claiming that Pakistan might carry out its first atomic bomb test at the end of 1980 or at the beginning of 1981.⁸¹ Although President Carter, in early May 1980, relented on these U.S. conditions and now indicated willingness to sell India 38 tons of enriched uranium, the President was rebuffed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission which opposed shipment to India because it did not sign the non-proliferation treaty.⁸² Gandhi's position remained unaltered. To a visiting delegation of U.S. Congressmen on June 1, she reiterated India's need

to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes (adding) this should not rule out nuclear explosions, if necessary.⁸³

⁸⁰Delhi Domestic Service, 1230 GMT (March 15, 1980). FBIS, DR, SA (March 17, 1980), p. 518.

⁸¹Karachi Domestic Service, 1500 GMT (April 2, 1980). FBIS, DR, SA (April 3, 1980), p. F1. The Pakistanis criticized the Indian report, claiming that it provided India with the justification for exploding its second nuclear weapon. Ibid.

⁸²Washington Post (May 29, 1980), p. 1.

⁸³Delhi Domestic Service, 1230 GMT (May 29, 1980). FBIS, DR, SA (June 2, 1980), p. E1.

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India's concern for maintaining the right to carry out "explosions or implosions if necessary" was now more openly and clearly linked to a heightened, intensified threat perception of the PRC and Pakistan. External Affairs Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao, in response to Parliamentary questions on June 11, noted that China's military tie-up with Japan and the U.S. ["the two sides speak of a common strategic assessment"] to be posed

a great threat to peace and security of Asia in general and India in particular (adding that) the Chinese ICBM capabilities are being taken into account in our defense preparation.⁸⁴

In August, Indian media commentary criticized Pakistan's nuclear free zone concept for South Asia ("India considers the treaty discriminatory") because it did not include the PRC.⁸⁵

While India's desire for enriched uranium for Tarapur remained a source of constant tension with the U.S., India's hunger for nuclear technology, specifically for the acquisition of delivery vehicles, continued. On August 7, 1980, Gandhi told Parliament that India had bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements with 18 countries, including the U.S. and USSR.⁸⁶ In July 1980, India successfully launched its first indigenous satellite launch vehicle (SLV), the SLV-3. Then in September, Professor S. S. Dhawan, Chairman of India's Space Commission, divulged that an Indian-made rocket engine prototype at the Thumba space center was now ready; and that while considerable work had been done in designing and

⁸⁴Delhi Domestic Service, 1530 GMT (June 11, 1980). FBIS, DR, SA (June 12, 1980), p. E1.

⁸⁵Mahendra Kumar Commentary, Delhi General Overseas Service, 1010 GMT (August 7, 1980), p. E4.

⁸⁶The other countries were Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, France, West Germany, Hungary, Iran, Iraq, Italy, Libya, Poland, Romania, Syria and Yugoslavia. See Hong Kong AFP, 1253 GMT (August 7, 1980). FBIS, DR, SA (August 8, 1980), p. E2.

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fabricating rocket engines in India, the Soviet Union was assisting India by providing certain components free of cost for their second earth observation satellite ("Bhaskara-II") which would be launched in mid-1981.⁸⁷

In December 1980, S. S. Dhawan revealed plans to achieve self-sufficiency in space technology in the 1980's but denied speculations that India had developed a missile capability. Although Dhawan noted that "there was no plan to develop an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) or intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM)," he did reveal that India planned more advanced SLV's, weighing 330 tons (compared to the SLV-3's 17 tons) and capable of putting 600 kg satellites into orbit.⁸⁸

1-8 INDIA'S CONCERN ABOUT PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR (F-16 AND NAVAL) THREAT

Ever since 1981, as the war in Afghanistan began to acquire a more protracted nature and as U.S. arms continued to flow to Pakistan, India evidenced greater concern for Pakistan's alleged nuclear aspirations, and India's nuclear program appeared to take on a frenzied atmosphere. On February 19, 1981, Junior Science and Technology Minister C. P. N. Singh told Parliament that there was a short-cut plan to launch an improved version of the SLV-3 by adding strap-on rockets to give greater thrust, making it capable of putting a 150 kg satellite in orbit.⁸⁹ In April, Prime Minister Gandhi also indicated concern over Pakistani nuclear developments. In an April 9 Parliamentary debate, the Prime Minister made note of Pakistan's "move to acquire massive and sophisticated weaponry from the U.S.," [adding that while]

⁸⁷(Karachi) Morning News (September 27, 1980), p. 1. FBIS, DR, SA (October 17, 1980), p. E2.

⁸⁸Hong Kong, AFP, 1400 GMT (14 October 1980). FBIS, DR, SA (December 14, 1980), p. E3.

⁸⁹Hong Kong AFP, 1421 GMT (February 19, 1981). FBIS, DR, SA (February 20, 1981), p. E2.

[REDACTED]

India is not afraid of anyone...(the) development of nuclear weapons by Pakistan will have grave and irreversible consequences for the subcontinent.⁹⁰

On April 27, in an address to a Parliamentary committee, Gandhi noted that Pakistan "may go in for a nuclear explosion anytime between July this year and September next year."⁹¹ She also informed Parliament that Pakistan had built a second reprocessing plant capable of producing 20 to 25 kg of plutonium every year; and that Pakistan's present capability in centrifuges (needed to separate uranium to be used in nuclear devices) consisted of two plants which had a capability of producing 25-28 kg of enriched uranium annually. Finally, in an April 30 interview, Gandhi articulated fear that the Indian subcontinent would become part of the nuclear and traditional arms race in the coming years.⁹²

Gandhi's threat perceptions apparently were not a cause for any cleavage between political and military elites in India. The Indian Chief of Army, General K. V. Krishna, in a June 1, 1981 interview, supported Gandhi by stating:

When your adversaries (e.g., PRC and Pakistan) have nuclear weapons and you have only conventional weapons, the situation is not a very happy one. We cannot afford to ignore the development and appropriate means will have to be taken by us. (Emphasis added.)⁹³

⁹⁰Delhi Domestic Service, 1530 GMT (April 9, 1981). FBIS, DR, SA (April 10, 1981), p. E1.

⁹¹Delhi Domestic Service, 1530 GMT (April 27, 1981). FBIS, DR, SA (April 28, 1981), p. E1.

⁹²(Manama) Gulf News Agency, 1715 GMT (April 30, 1981). FBIS, DR, SA (May 1, 1981), p. E1.

⁹³Delhi Domestic Service, 1595 GMT (June 1, 1981). FBIS, DR, SA (June 3, 1981), p. E1.

[REDACTED]

It might be noted, as an aside, that the Soviets kept fueling India's threat perceptions, whether accurate or not. For example, during this period one Soviet media source alleged that in the border area near India, the PRC was "rigging up missile sites."⁹⁴

In March 1982, sources close to the Indian Defense Ministry told members of the Parliament's consultative committee that "Pakistan is two thirds on its way to an atomic bomb" and informed them that uranium was currently being transformed into plutonium in the "Kanupp" reactor near Karachi.⁹⁵ Keeping in mind that Gandhi had only recently informed Parliament of Pakistan's plutonium and enriched uranium annual production capabilities as being about 20 to 25 kg and 25 to 28 kg respectively, if one were to generally estimate that 10 kg of each is necessary to produce one nuclear warhead, then India, whether or not its estimates of Pakistan's production were correct, was planning against a potential Pakistani threat of five nuclear weapons being produced annually.

Pakistan also provided a heightened threat to India from both the air and sea. When the U.S. agreed to sell Pakistan's F-16's in a \$3 billion arms package, the Indian Foreign Ministry "noted (the announcement) with concern."⁹⁶ A western journalistic account emanating from Delhi noted that, in response to the F-16 challenge, India is likely to step up immediately its MiG-23 and MiG-25 purchases, and in the longer term acquire Mirage 2000's.⁹⁷ Despite the fact that many commentaries emphasized that India wanted the Mirage 2000's to counter the F-16's, in reality, India had been holding discussions with the French in

⁹⁴S. Agafonov, "Beijing's Smokescreen," Izvestiya (July 9, 1981), p. 5. FBIS, DR, SU (July 17, 1981), p. B2.

⁹⁵Hong Kong AFP, 0931 GMT (March 9, 1982). FBIS, DR, SA (March 9, 1982), p. E1.

⁹⁶Bernard Gwertzman, "Ties to India: New Strains," New York Times (July 6, 1981), p. 1.

⁹⁷Carol Hensa, "India Turns to Soviets to Bolster its Arsenal After U.S. Agrees to Supply Pakistan with F-16's," Christian Science Monitor (July 10, 1981), p. 3.

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early 1980, long before the F-16 issue came into the picture. The real deadlock between India and France was over India's tough bargaining for terms comparable to those in India's 1980 Soviet arms package (e.g., credit repayable over 17 years at 2.5 percent interest and no cost escalation clauses). In previous arms deals with India, France always sold arms for hard cash; and although France was willing to extend credit on the \$3 billion/150 Mirage 2000 package, the terms were not acceptable to India.⁹⁸ Whatever India's true motives and intentions were, Prime Minister Gandhi publicly noted in February 1982 that by selling the F-16's to Pakistan, the

United States...indicated its utter lack of understanding of India's position...(noting) the sale has added tremendously to India's burdens and has brought dangers and pressures much closer to our borders.⁹⁹

In addition to the F-16 "threat," after Pakistan acquired French-manufactured Exocet missiles, India's Deputy Defense Minister K. P. Singhdeo told Parliament that

the government has taken note of these developments and steps are being taken to curb the possible threat through the employment of highly sophisticated weapons.¹⁰⁰

Indian naval concerns were also very much in evidence. Addressing a news conference on December 9, 1981, Admiral Pereira, Chief of the Indian Naval Staff, said that

Measures are being taken to strengthen and develop bases at the Andaman, Nicobar and Laccadine group of islands because of their strategic location... (adding) three of these bases will be able

⁹⁸For a particularly good discussion of this issue, see Foreign Report (November 19, 1981), p. E1.

⁹⁹Delhi Domestic Service, 0290 GMT (February 8, 1982). FBIS, DR, SA (February 8, 1982), p. E1.

¹⁰⁰Delhi Domestic Service, 0830 GMT (July 9, 1982). FBIS, DR, SA (July 14, 1982), p. E2.

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to receive sophisticated frigates within three years.¹⁰¹

Defense Minister Venkataraman was more specific as to the naval "threat" during a March 1982 visit to the Andaman and Nicobar Islands which (he noted) had "become strategically important in the light of the superpower rivalry in the Indian Ocean area."¹⁰² Shortly thereafter, India's Chief of the Naval Staff divulged that India, with FRG collaboration, would indigenously build sophisticated submarines. Admiral Dawson also disclosed that the Indian Navy had gone in for Indianization of radar systems, turbines and communications systems.¹⁰³

In sum, as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan acquired a more protracted nature and as U.S. arms (including F-16's) were being sent to Pakistan, India's perceptions of Pakistani (and U.S.-PRC) threats to its security only intensified. Although U.S., Pakistani and PRC activities were beyond the control of India's political-military leadership, they did serve as a catalyst for India's acquisition and development of indigenous production of nuclear technology and sophisticated delivery vehicles. In India's effort to achieve this goal, the U.S. remained a "stumbling block" and the Soviet Union a willing and able ally.

1-9 RECENT INDIAN NUCLEAR AND SPACE DEVELOPMENTS

While the U.S. was perceived as being one of the "problems" in the Indian Ocean, it was also a source of continuing Indian aggravation over nuclear policy. Although Junior Minister for Science and Technology C. P. N. Singh stated to Parliament on February 19, 1981 that "adequate proven resources of uranium...exist in India to support its nuclear program," Gandhi was still pressing the U.S. for further enriched uranium

¹⁰¹Delhi Domestic Service, 0240 GMT (December 9, 1981). FBIS, DR, SA (December 10, 1981), p. E1.

¹⁰²Delhi Domestic Service, 1530 GMT (March 13, 1982). FBIS, DR, SA (March 15, 1982), p. E1.

¹⁰³Delhi Domestic Service, 1230 GMT (June 12, 1982). FBIS, DR, SA (June 15, 1982).

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supplies.¹⁰⁴ Problems continued to exist between the two countries, however, because the U.S. was claiming that the "spent fuel" from an (earlier) enriched uranium supply for Tarapur belonged to the U.S., while Gandhi argued it belonged to India.¹⁰⁵ In December 1981, the Prime Minister finally admitted that delays in U.S. enriched uranium supplies forced the Tarapur power station to reduce production in order to stretch the fuel cycle. She also informed Parliament that the first plant to reprocess the spent nuclear fuel (from the Tarapur and Rajasthan reactors) had already been installed in Tarapur.¹⁰⁶

U.S.-Indian tensions still smoldered during 1982. In addition to Indian concerns about U.S. arms to Pakistan and military buildup in the Indian Ocean, when Gandhi visited the U.S. on 29-30 July 1982, she told President Reagan that India's right to reprocess the spent fuel was "clear and firm" under the 1963 agreement and that India was considering obtaining enriched uranium from France. The U.S. continued to adhere to the view that there should be a "joint determination."¹⁰⁷ On the other hand, according to a report in Nuclear India magazine, India has adequate (assured and estimated) resources of uranium to meet the country's requirements for its nuclear power program. The state-owned Uranium Corporation of India was reported as having produced "about 100 tons of natural uranium fuel and about 20 tons of enriched uranium fuel."¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁴Hong Kong AFP, 1710 GMT (February 19, 1981). FBIS, DR, SA (February 20, 1981), p. E2.

¹⁰⁵Delhi Domestic Service, 1530 GMT (April 27, 1981). FBIS, DR, SA (April 28, 1981), p. E1.

¹⁰⁶Delhi Domestic Service, 0830 and 1230 GMT (December 16, 1981). FBIS, DR, SA (December 24, 1981), p. E1.

¹⁰⁷Hong Kong AFP, 1972 GMT (August 2, 1982). FBIS, DR, SA (August 3, 1982), p. E1.

¹⁰⁸There were alleged to be 67,000 tons of uranium trioxide in addition to 13,000 tons in the monazite stands along the beaches. India's thorium resources were estimated at 300,000 tons. See The Statesman (Calcutta) (September 27, 1982), p. 13. FBIS, DR, SA (October 14, 1982), p. E3.

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In marked contrast to U.S.-Indian differences over nuclear policy, the USSR appeared more willing than ever to facilitate India's efforts. Shortly after Gandhi's July 29-30, 1982 visit to the U.S., Gandhi visited Moscow (September 20-26) where she told Brezhnev that past Soviet assistance to India had helped in achieving the goal of self-reliance, and added that India "needs, at this stage, Soviet support to strengthen her industry, particularly in the nuclear energy field...at a low rate of interest."¹⁰⁹

Although specific results in energy cooperation were not announced, Indian S&T agreements with the USSR indicated unparalleled closeness. On May 22, 1982, the Soviets signed an agreement which would give India assistance in launching an Indian satellite for remote earth probes by the mid-1980's.¹¹⁰ On September 17 (just before Gandhi's Moscow visit), the Indo-Soviet governmental commission signed a protocol identifying lasers as a "new area" of S&T cooperation.¹¹¹ On October 8, Gandhi revealed to Parliament that India had been importing about 40 tons of heavy water from the Soviet Union annually to supplement India's indigenous production.¹¹²

The fruits of Indo-Soviet cooperation again were made apparent on April 17, 1983, when India launched its third Rohini satellite into orbit from the Island of Sriharikota.¹¹³ Although an Indian-made rocket

¹⁰⁹Delhi Domestic Service, 0290 GMT (September 21, 1982). FBIS, DR, SU (September 21, 1982), p. D7.

¹¹⁰Up to this point, three Indian satellites, designed and built with the participation of Soviet specialists, had been launched by Soviet carrier rockets. TASS, 1020 GMT (May 22, 1982), p. D1.

¹¹¹Delhi Domestic Service, 1230 GMT (September 17, 1982). FBIS, DR, SU (September 20, 1982), p. D2.

¹¹²Delhi Domestic Service, 0830 GMT (October 8, 1982). FBIS, DR, SA (October 14, 1982), p. E3.

¹¹³Washington Post (April 18, 1983), p. A17.

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first launched a Rohini satellite in July 1980, symbolically putting India into the exclusive world space club, the most recent launch indicated the continued close cooperation between India and the USSR.

1-10 INDIA'S ROLE IN A SINO-SOVIET WAR

If one were to speculate on India's role in a Sino-Soviet (short of general) war, a brief description of the past fifteen years' developments (in Soviet-Indo threat perception and cooperation agreements) suggests that India would, with little doubt, politically support the USSR against the PRC. This assessment is not based upon any deep-seated loyalty to the USSR necessarily, but upon a clear (if not legitimate) perception of the PRC as a threat to India's security. Indeed, the joint Soviet-Indian perception of the PRC as a threat became "locked in concrete" in the August 9, 1971 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. Whatever the original intent for joint obligations between the two signators, subsequent events have tended only to reinforce and deepen their mutual ties.

The U.S. became involved in the subcontinent when President Nixon's new strategy focused on finding "channels" to Peking in order to balance the USSR. On the one hand, in the wake of the March 1969 Ussuri crisis, the USSR perceived U.S.-Chinese actions as quite threatening to its security and (after Kissinger's July 1971 "secret" visit to Peking) "drove" them to Delhi. On the other hand, U.S. reliance upon the "Pakistani channel" contributed to the U.S. "tilt" toward Pakistan during the Indo-Pakistan War in the fall of 1971 (the USSR supported India), an event which India has never forgotten. In sum, from India's perspective, the U.S. cannot be trusted; while the USSR, on the other hand, has always stood by India, remaining a "true" friend.

From India's perspective, the U.S. has consistently supported regional clients (e.g., Pakistan and the PRC) that endanger India's security. In the mid-1970's, U.S. arms to Iran were perceived, whether or not correctly, as ending up in Pakistan to be used against India. In the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, U.S. arms flowing to Pakistan (not the Soviet invasion) were again perceived as the threat. Pakistan's

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acquisition of F-16's and nuclear technology have made Pakistan an even more serious threat for India.

Since Richard Nixon's visit to Peking and the signing of the Shanghai Communique in February 1972, U.S. relations with the PRC have remained on course. During the mid-1970's, the Indians portrayed U.S. nuclear proliferation policy as being "blind" to the PRC. After the U.S. established diplomatic relations with the PRC on January 1, 1979, India (and the USSR) indicated concern about U.S. military assistance going to China.

Added to these rather fundamental differences between the U.S. and India over regional clients, other endemic issues have poisoned relations. The U.S. base at Diego Garcia and U.S. nuclear (Naval and air) presence (and that of Pakistan) is perceived as a threat to Indian and Indian Ocean security. In turn, this has prompted an Indian naval (and air) buildup and base fortifications (e.g., Andaman and Nicobar Islands) which have drained Indian resources (from its borders with Pakistan and the PRC). In addition, U.S. nuclear non-cooperation (e.g., first over-enriched uranium supplies for Tarapur and recently over "spent fuel") has been a perennial headache.

Over the past fifteen years, if one were to weigh Soviet political, military, economic and S&T support for India against that provided by the U.S., there is no question where the scale would tilt. Just as the U.S. "tilted" toward Pakistan during 1971, India would likely "tilt" toward the USSR. First, both India and the USSR share the same regional threat perception (e.g., Pakistan and the PRC). Second, the Soviets also support India's policy of making the Indian Ocean a nuclear free zone, including the removal of the U.S. from Diego Garcia. Finally, the Soviets have consistently supported India's objectives with military (S&T and space) assistance and arms supplies that are unparalleled. In fact, Soviet terms have been so favorable for India, they appear to have had an effect on India's expectations in its arms deals with other countries, notably with France over Mirage 2000's.

To paraphrase Gandhi's words, "the Soviets have stood by us always, only asking for friendship in return." The Soviets supported Gandhi when

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she declared a "State of Emergency" in the summer of 1975; and Indo-Soviet relations were not altered either by Desai's surprise electoral victory in March 1977 or by Gandhi's victory in January 1980. Additionally, no change in political-military elite attitudes, either toward the U.S., PRC, and Pakistan on the one hand, or toward the USSR on the other, have been evident during the past fifteen years. Most important is the apparent Indian elite consensus that indigenoussness of India's arms production and S&T and space activities is essential to Indian security. In this arena, the USSR has at least created the appearance of rendering India assistance in achieving this goal.

As already noted, according to Parliamentary reports, India perceives Pakistan's production of plutonium and enriched uranium (at an annual rate of five nuclear weapons per year) as a threat that must be countered, particularly when in the hands of an "unstable" leadership. India has also acknowledged that the PRC's nuclear developments "are being taken into account" in its defense planning. Hence, it is not implausible to speculate that India is in all likelihood producing its own nuclear weapons to meet both PRC and Pakistan requirements. Hypothetically, by 1985 (if it started production in 1981) conservatively India could have an inventory of 25 nuclear weapons. Linking these weapons either to sophisticated means of delivery (e.g., indigenous rocket launching capability providing potential MRBM's) or less sophisticated, but nevertheless quite sufficient air or sea delivery systems, India could theoretically play a military role against the PRC in a future Sino-Soviet war.

Whether or not India would militarily support the USSR against the PRC is not so much the issue (presumably the Soviets could handle the PRC by themselves); rather India's political support for the USSR is a high probability. In light of this support, particularly considering India's probable naval and air assets in the 1985-1990 period, India could provide a credible deterrent against other local states assisting the PRC (e.g., Pakistan) and could make U.S. planning much more complicated for naval operations in the Indian Ocean region.

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SECTION 2
LOCAL WAR: INDO-PAKISTANI CONFLICT

Pakistan and China have maintained close relations for three decades because of common strategic perceptions. Both share the congruent desire to establish good relations with Muslim countries in the Middle East and both perceive India and the Soviet Union as potential threats to their security. In fact, the most important factor underlying the Sino-Pakistani entente were the threats posed to the two nations by India and the USSR. Time and again (e.g., the 1962, 1965 and 1971 conflicts with India) China supported Pakistan in a highly visible manner. When the risks were not prohibitive, the PRC even became militarily involved.¹

Following the Ussuri conflict and the Soviet military buildup along the eastern frontier, both Pakistan and the PRC had an interest in countering this threat and both perceived the U.S. as the potential balancer. The PRC was willing to entertain Kissinger (July 1971) and Nixon in Peking (February 1972), and was only willing to rely on the "Yahya Channel" during the "secret" negotiations. In other words, both Pakistan and the PRC shared a consensus on both the U.S. and the USSR during this period and both evidently trusted each other. During the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war, both the U.S. and PRC supported Pakistan, while the USSR supported India. In addition, when India exploded its first nuclear device in May 1974, both Pakistan and China perceived this as an Indian effort to achieve supremacy on the subcontinent, which caused Pakistan and China to draw closer together.

2-1 PRE-AFGHANISTAN: THE UPS AND DOWNS OF U.S.-PAKISTANI RELATIONS

While Pakistan's relations with the PRC have remained consistently close, relations with the U.S. have run hot and cold. One issue that has

¹For a good general work on this relationship, see Yaacov Vertzberger, The Enduring Entente: Sino-Pakistani Relations 1960-1980, The Washington Papers No. 95 (Washington: The Center for Strategic and International Studies (Praeger, 1983).

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constantly marred relations has been Pakistan's clear desire to acquire nuclear weapons ever since India's May 1974 detonation. Coupled with this issue has been Pakistan's rather voracious appetite for sophisticated weapons. Being much smaller than India and lacking the industrial base to produce the wide range of armaments made in India, Pakistan must rely more heavily upon outside sources for arms (since it lacks an indigenous productive capability) and for credit and/or assistance. Partly because of Pakistan's dependence on imported weapons, Pakistan has cultivated relations with fellow Moslem nations in the Middle East with sources of oil money (e.g., Saudi Arabia and Libya).

During 1976, Pakistani relations with the U.S. became quite strained over both nuclear and conventional arms issues. By now the U.S. had established liaison contact with the PRC and no longer needed to rely on Pakistan as it did during the 1969-1972 period. Since India's May 1974 detonation, Pakistan had been increasingly talking publicly about making nuclear weapons. When it appeared that France was willing to sell Pakistan equipment capable of reprocessing fuel from nuclear power plants into weapons grade material, the Ford Administration sought to discourage the sale as part of its opposition to nuclear proliferation. Bhutto, in an interview in the Dutch De Telegraaf noted Jimmy Carter's support of President Ford's nuclear stance:

What business is it of this man? I tell you, if Carter is elected, or if President Ford returns, and they thwart us on this point, we will cancel the alliance with America. Then we will ask the Soviet Union for the things we need.²

Arms issues were also a cause for tension. Pakistan had been seeking 110 A7 aircraft (capable of carrying 7 tons of ordinance for 600 miles) to counter India's 300 MiG-21 bis aircraft. (At the time Pakistan had MiG-19's provided by the PRC). Although the Pentagon gave a qualified approval to the A7 sale, the State Department withheld approval. (The

²Henry Bradsher, "Pakistan Threatens to Switch to Soviet Arms," Washington Star (November 18, 1976), p. 9.

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U.S. had restricted arms sales to Pakistan ever since 1965 when Pakistan used U.S.-supplied arms against India.) In a November 6, 1976 interview, Bhutto claimed that the U.S. discriminated against Pakistan and threatened

We too are not married to CENTO...if events force us, we might also consider Pakistan's withdrawal from CENTO, and that would, at least, bring about a better understanding in our relations with the Soviet Union.³

In sum, by the end of 1976 U.S.-Pakistani relations were less than cordial.

On July 5, 1977, Pakistani General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq successfully launched an army coup to put an end to "strife between political parties" and to prepare for new general elections.⁴ After Zia was sworn in as Pakistan's president in September, his pursuit to acquire nuclear weapons appeared even more vigorous than Bhutto's. At a June 1978 seminar organized by Pakistan's Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), Zia reaffirmed Pakistan's determination to acquire an atomic reprocessing plant, claiming that it was "essential for the country's overall development" and adding that the plant would be used for "peaceful purposes." Zia also noted that the government was determined to promote S&T, adding that he had "allocated a substantial amount of money in the next five-year development plan."⁵ A few weeks later, Zia's chief advisor on foreign affairs, Agha Shahi continued the offensive. While claiming that Pakistan's goal was non-proliferation, he regretted that some unnamed nuclear powers and their allies were practicing discrimination against Pakistan. Shahi then argued that:

The major powers themselves should first set an example by reducing their nuclear weapons. Secondly, it is necessary to apply uniform and nondiscriminating safeguards over the nuclear facilities of all

³See Henry Bradsher, op. cit.

⁴A. Maslennikov, "Pakistan: Stages of Development," Pravda (August 13, 1977), p. 5. FBIS, DR, SU (August 16, 1977), p. J4.

⁵Karachi Overseas Service, 0800 GMT (June 17, 1978). FBIS, DR, SA (June 19, 1978). FBU, DR, SA (June 19, 1978), p. S3.

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non-nuclear states, especially South Africa and Israel. Instead of countering this immediate danger, the nuclear supplier states have imposed unilateral policies to prevent the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes in the Third World countries.⁶

That Shahi had the U.S. in mind was obvious.

During 1979, both the U.S. and the Soviet Union indicated concern over developments in Pakistan. On March 12, Pakistan withdrew from CENTO; and in response to Zia's execution of Bhutto in the spring, the U.S. announced that it would cancel the \$40 million in aid for FY79 and \$45 million for FY80, previously promised to Pakistan for development purposes. The Soviets, on the other hand, expressed concern with Pakistan over Afghanistan. In April, Izvestiya alleged that Pakistan was using its territory "for the formation and training of gangs of Afghan counter-revolutionaries of every stripe."⁷ In June, Pravda issued the following threat:

Violations of the DRA's sovereignty, incursions of armed gangs into its territory from Pakistan and attempts to create a crisis in this region cannot leave the Soviet Union indifferent either. The matter is moving toward a conflict in our immediate vicinity. It is a case of actual aggression against a state with which the USSR has a common border. (Emphasis added.)⁸

The Soviet Union was also concerned about Pakistan's nuclear developments. Pravda made specific note of a "secret uranium enrichment plant...being constructed in Pakistan." It also made reference to:

⁶Karachi Domestic Service, 1700 GMT (August 29, 1978). FBIS, DR, SA (August 30, 1978), p. S2.

⁷V. Midtsev, "On Topical Themes," Izvestiya (April 15, 1979), p. 4. FBIS, DR, SU (April 19, 1979), p. D1.

⁸A. Petrov, "Provocations Continue," Pravda (June 1, 1979), p. 5. FBIS, DR, SU (June 5, 1979), p. D1.

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- (1) Pakistani representatives purchasing from British, West German, and other Western private firms a wide range of equipment necessary for enriching uranium;
 - (2) A U.S. scientist named J. Philips who claimed a proposal was made to him to help create a nuclear weapon for Pakistan; and
 - (3) Beijing propagandizing and attempting to "ideologically justify" pushing Islamabad on to such a dangerous path.⁹

Toward the end of December, reports circulating in diplomatic circles alleged that the purpose of Zia's visit to Saudi Arabia and Agha Shahi's sudden visit to Iran was to acquaint the two Islamic states with what was described as an advanced level in the completion of "the Islamic nuclear bomb." The reports alleged that Pakistani-Libyan cooperation made the manufacture of a nuclear weapon possible by mid-1981.¹⁰ In sum, by the end of 1979, Pakistani relations with the U.S. and the USSR (and India) were quite cool, in large part, due to Pakistan's efforts to acquire nuclear weapons.

2-2 THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN AND ITS IMMEDIATE EFFECTS ON PAKISTAN

While the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on December 27, 1979, put some immediate strains on Soviet relations with India (which the USSR attempted to rectify), it drove Pakistan and the U.S. (and PRC) closer together. It also stimulated Pakistan's already healthy appetite for more weapons and accelerated its efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. Both policies--arms and nuclear weapons--as demonstrated in the previous chapter, aggravated relations between Pakistan and India.

⁹Arkadiy Maslennikov, "Commentator's Column: Urgent Task," Pravda (April 13, 1979), p. 5. FBIS, DR, SU (April 18, 1979), p. D9.

¹⁰Diplomatic Editor, "The Islamic Nuclear Bomb," (Kuwait) As-Saiyashah (October 27, 1979), pp. 1, 16. FBIS, DR, ME-A (January 2, 1980), p. S26.

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In the immediate aftermath of the invasion, the PRC and U.S. took a very active role in Pakistan. During January 1980, numerous reports indicated stepped up movement of military hardware, on a large scale, through the Karakoram highway, which connects the Chinese provincial capital of Urumchi with Islamabad, to bolster Pakistan's military preparedness.¹¹ Between January 20 and 23, Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua visited Zia in Islamabad. Both leaders appeared to share a consensus that the Soviet threat in the DRA should lead to closer political and military cooperation between Pakistan and China. Specifically, Huang Hua made note of the Soviets'

expansionist design constituting a grave danger not only to Pakistan but to the Gulf states..., Asia and ultimately to the world at large.¹²

Two weeks later, U.S. National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski and Warren Christopher visited Pakistan to provide military assistance. Although Zia wanted \$1 billion in aid, the Carter Administration considered \$400 million over two years an adequate figure.¹³ Izvestiya argued that Pakistan was "playing a dangerous game" with the PRC and U.S.¹⁴

On March 14, 1980, when the new Chinese military delegation arrived in Islamabad to hold talks on further expansion of military aid to Pakistan, TASS claimed that the PRC had already given \$2 billion in aid to Pakistan, noting that in reality this was U.S. aid which was being funneled through the PRC to conceal the extent of the U.S. commitment.

¹¹Hong Kong AFP, 1330 GMT (January 17, 1980). FBIS, DR, ME-A (January 18, 1980), p. S12.

¹²Karachi Domestic Service, 1315 GMT (January 23, 1980). FBIS, DR, ME-A (January 24, 1980), p. S17.

¹³Barry Blechman, "No Middle Ground on Pakistan," Washington Post (February 11, 1980); and Dusko Doder, "Pakistan Uninterested in U.S. Aid Offer," Washington Post (March 6, 1980), pp. A24-25.

¹⁴S. Kondrashov, "Political Observer's Notes," Izvestiya (February 7, 1980). FBIS, DR, SU (February 1980), p. A7.

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Pakistan, according to TASS, was becoming a regional policeman.¹⁵ At the end of the year, TASS made note of all the U.S. and PRC delegations visiting Islamabad in order

to inspect places of concentration of anti-Afghan reaction and to further draw Pakistan into Washington's and Beijing's undeclared war against the DRA.¹⁶

Pakistan's nuclear developments, which were being constantly compared to India's, were closely tracked by both India and the USSR. In February 1980, Krasnaya Zvezda noted that 20 tons of uranium concentrate which "disappeared" in Niger had surfaced in Pakistan. In addition, the same article alleged that the Kozhema Company (a French enterprise in Niger) sold 400 tons of uranium ore to Pakistan in 1979, and that a Pakistani engineer, Abdol Kader Khan, had

- (1) obtained technology for uranium enrichment from Urenco (a West German, British and Dutch consortium);
- (2) purchased the necessary equipment for enriching uranium in the U.K.; and
- (3) was now heading the construction of a uranium enrichment plant in Kohat.

In conclusion, the article claimed that Pakistan had also prepared an underground bomb site in the Baluchistan desert.¹⁷

In a February 29, 1980 interview in Frankfurter Rundschau, Zia claimed that

We are not for nuclear weapons. If India believes that we are developing an atom bomb, and if we admit that India is farther advanced, then India should

¹⁵ Moscow TASS, 1830 GMT (March 14, 1980). FBIS, DR, SU (March 20, 1980), p. D5.

¹⁶ Moscow TASS, 0758 GMT (November 12, 1980). FBIS, DR, SU (November 12, 1980), p. D6.

¹⁷ Captain V. Roshchupkin, "Dangerous Pretentions," Krasnaya Zvezda (February 16, 1980), p. 3. FBIS, DR, SU (February 22, 1980), p. D4.

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not worry about Pakistan--our nuclear energy exclusively serves peaceful purposes.¹⁸

In another interview on March 7, Zia noted that despite U.S. opposition, "We are still going ahead with Pakistan's nuclear program." In response to a question regarding a Pakistani nuclear weapon, Zia retorted:

Why must I reveal whether we will make it or reject it in the future? I still have many options. At present we are not making the bomb because you cannot ask for peace while you are armed to the teeth.¹⁹

On April 2, 1980, the Foreign Office in Islamabad rejected as "incorrect and baseless" an Indian report that Pakistan would carry out an atomic bomb test at the end of 1980 or early 1981.²⁰ The Pakistani Foreign Office offered in retort that the Indian report was but a prelude to India's own intention to explode a second nuclear device. In addition, in July, the Pakistani media noted that the first squadron of Jaguar aircraft had been formed in the Indian Air Force and was now fully operational. The article specifically noted that the laser guidance unit (called Ariel) which is implanted in the nose cone of rockets, missiles or bombs, makes them 100 percent accurate.²¹ In summary, in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Pakistan continued to portray India's nuclear developments and sophisticated air delivery systems (e.g., Jaguars with laser guidance missiles) as a threat to Pakistan.

At a news conference on August 31, Munir Ahmed Khan, Chairman of the Pakistan AEC, announced that "Pakistan has now entered the group of 12 select countries of the world which produce nuclear fuel themselves,"

¹⁸Zia interview, Frankfurter Rundschau (February 29, 1980), pp. 10-11. FBIS, DR, ME-A (March 5, 1980), pp. S14-15.

¹⁹Zia interview, Al-Hawadith (London) (March 7, 1980), pp. 28-30. FBIS, DR, ME-A (March 11, 1980), p. S24.

²⁰Karachi Domestic Service, 1501 GMT (April 2, 1980). FBIS, DR, SA (April 3, 1980), p. F1.

²¹Dawn (Karachi) (July 8, 1980), p. 10. FBIS, DR, SA (July 22, 1980), p. E2.

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adding that the fuel, produced in the Chashma complex, had been successfully used in the Karachi nuclear power plant.²² The AEC Chairman stated that the indigenously produced nuclear fuel would be used for peaceful purposes and noted that the government had approved an \$800 million, 600 megawatt nuclear power plant at Chashma. The Soviet media not only made note of the Pakistan AEC Chairman's news conference, but also added that Urenco had sold fuel enrichment equipment to Pakistan in 1975, that Pakistan was planning to manufacture nuclear weapons, and that the U.S. and PRC were supporting Pakistani efforts to possess nuclear weapons.²³

On December 1, 1980, on the occasion of Indonesian President Suharto's visit to the Karachi nuclear power project, Pakistan's Zia proudly declared that the nuclear power station was "the first of its kind in the entire Muslim world" adding that Pakistan is now manufacturing its own "spares and fuel... This is indeed a great achievement for which this country can rightly feel proud."²⁴

In summary, both Munir Ahmed Khan and President Zia publicly gloated in being one of the "select" nuclear fuel producers and in having the "first Muslim nuclear power station in the entire world." Hence, international prestige was, at the minimum, an added motivation to the national security incentives (vis-a-vis) the Indian threat embodied in Pakistan's nuclear program.

²²Karachi Domestic Service, 1500 GMT (August 31, 1980). FBIS, DR, SA (September 2, 1980), p. F2.

²³Yevgeny Nikolayev commentary, Moscow in Hindi to India, 1130 GMT (September 3, 1980). FBIS, DR, SU (September 4, 1980), pp. D3-4; and V. Kondrashov, "Dangerous Relapses," Izvestiya (September 9, 1980), p. 5. FBIS, DR, SU (September 9, 1980), pp. D3-4.

²⁴Karachi Domestic Service, 1715 GMT (December 1, 1980). FBIS, DR, SA (December 4, 1980), p. F4.

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2-3 PAKISTAN, NPT, AND THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION

On January 18, 1981, in a Gulf News Agency interview, Zia confidently noted:

We are aware of the seriousness of the Soviet presence near Pakistani borders. We realize that Pakistan will be the next target after Afghanistan... Pakistan will not be alone, but will be supported by other (unnamed) countries.²⁵

While Zia did not mention the U.S. (or PRC), Pakistan's relations with the Ford and Carter Administrations, it will be recalled, had been cool over the issue of arms and nuclear proliferation. The onset of the Reagan Administration changed this as Washington was apparently now willing to overlook Islamabad's nuclear program. Foreign Minister Agha Shahi visited the U.S. in April 1981 to work out a "new and durable" basis for the U.S.-Pakistani relationship. Although the Soviet invasion of the DRA underlined common U.S.-Pakistani perceptions and the need to formulate parallel policies, the Reagan Administration provided a catalyst for action. Now, according to Pakistani media comments, "no strings are to be attached to any military aid Pakistan receives from Washington."²⁶

TASS made note of the shift in U.S. policy, concluding that:

The willingness of the new American Administration to give Pakistan access to nuclear weapons is at variance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty as well as the U.S. commitments not to give assistance to countries which violate the policy of nuclear proliferation.²⁷

²⁵Gulf News Agency (Manama), 0545 GMT (January 18, 1981). FBIS, DR, ME-A (January 19, 1981), p. S2.

²⁶Editorial Dawn (Karachi) "New Turn in U.S.-Pakistani Relations," (April 24, 1981), p. 17. FBIS, DR, SA (April 28, 1981), pp. F1-2.

²⁷TASS, 1923 GMT (April 20, 1981). FBIS, DR, SU (April 21, 1981), p. A1.

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Foreign Minister Shahi, in an interview in June, was quite forthright about the new U.S.-Pakistani relationship. Shahi noted that the Reagan Administration had taken

a more realistic approach to Pakistan (compared to Carter)...and come forward with a much better offer of economic aid and military sales for a five-year period.²⁸

Apparently the U.S. did receive much in return for this policy shift. Shahi noted that Pakistan could not contemplate the grant of bases to the U.S. Later in the month, when U.S. Under Secretary of State James Buckley visited Islamabad and agreed to supply F-16's to Pakistan, TASS noted that these fighter bombers were "the same type which were used during Israel's bandit attack on Iraq (Osirak reactor)."²⁹ Another TASS report went even further, alleging that

de facto assistance in creating a Pakistani atomic bomb is part of Washington's extensive plans in heightening tensions in the Near and Middle East.³⁰

During July 13-16, 1981, when Pakistan's Defense Ministry General Secretary M. Rahim Khan visited the U.S. to discuss military deliveries, the Soviet media closely followed his activities. Pravda noted that "the U.S. wants Pakistan to be its policeman and springboard for its strategic intentions against the DRA and threatening India."³¹ Noting that

²⁸Foreign Minister Agha Shahi interview in Dawn (Karachi) (June 6, 1981), pp. 1, 10. FBIS, DR, SA (June 9, 1981), pp. F3-4.

²⁹TASS, 1931 GMT (June 16, 1981). FBIS, DR, SU (June 17, 1981), p. A0. Pravda also noted that Pakistan's "shopping list" included 400 M-60 tanks, 500 armored transporters, and over 100 helicopters in addition to the F-16's. V. Baykov, "Under Washington's Thumb," Pravda (June 25, 1981), p. 5. FBIS, DR, SU (June 30, 1981), p. D1.

³⁰TASS, 1141 GMT (June 16, 1981). FBIS, DR, SU (June 17, 1981), p. A7.

³¹"Why Pakistan is Being Armed," Pravda (July 13, 1981), p. 5. FBIS, DR, SU (July 17, 1981), p. A2.

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U.S. weapons to Pakistan were twice used against India (in 1965 and 1971), Pravda claimed "a special danger is posed by the fact that Pakistan is working on developing its own nuclear bomb."³²

A few weeks later, Pravda again made reference to India's "quite justified concern" with Pakistan's military buildup and noted that in recent days, "Pakistani troops have opened fire nine times on Indian border posts."³³ Pravda also quoted India's Prime Minister Gandhi as saying that without F-16's, Pakistan's Air Force would have a strike force three times greater than India's. Hence, the USSR closely followed Pakistan's military and nuclear developments and openly fueled and supported India's perception of these activities as constituting a threat to India.

Toward the end of 1981, Soviet concern with Pakistan's potential capability to develop and deliver nuclear weapons became even more pronounced. On October 14, Krasnaya Zvezda noted

What is particularly dangerous for the cause of peace is the fact that Pakistan is working on creating its own nuclear bomb.

Add to this the acquisition of F-16's

capable of carrying nuclear weapons, the role proposed for Pakistan as the gendarme of imperialism and hegemonism in Southwest Asia becomes apparent.³⁴

During November, when the PRC's Army Chief of Staff Yang Dezhi visited Islamabad, TASS made note of "unique" relations between the PRC and Pakistan alleging that

³²Ibid.

³³Oleg Leonidor, "Justified Concern," Pravda (July 28, 1981), p. 5. FBIS, DR, SU (August 4, 1981), p. D7.

³⁴Col. B. Peresvetov, "Playing with Fire: Pakistan Bridgehead for Aggression in Southwest Asia," Krasnaya Zvezda (October 14, 1981), p. 3. FBIS, DR, SU (October 23, 1981), p. D4.

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nuclear weapons development is going on in Pakistan with Chinese assistance (adding that) Beijing expressed willingness to make available a test range on Chinese territory for setting off a Pakistani nuclear device.³⁵

Another Soviet commentary in November noted that construction is about to end near Rawalpindi of a secret plant to enrich plutonium and a uranium enriching plant has already been built near Islamabad.³⁶

This same article noted that Pakistan had negotiated with Beijing and the West German Otrag Company "about the purchase of delivery means for nuclear weapons."³⁷ In summary, Soviet commentaries during 1981 alleged that

- (1) the U.S. was providing Pakistan with \$3.2 billion in military and economic aid in addition to 40 F-16's;
- (2) the PRC was providing more than \$2 billion worth of arms; and
- (3) that both the U.S. and PRC are helping Pakistan "to build its own nuclear bombs."³⁸

Responding to Radio Moscow broadcasts alleging that Pakistan would provide the U.S. with air and naval bases, the Pakistani government officially denied the Soviet charges as "totally unfounded and malicious" and reaffirmed its commitment "to the principles of non-alignment."³⁹ Ignoring the Pakistani response, TASS continued to allege that Zia

³⁵Vasiliy Kharkov, TASS, 1541 GMT (November 16, 1981). FBIS, DR, SU (November 17, 1981), p. D5.

³⁶Vladimir Korolev comment, Moscow World Service, 1400 GMT (November 25, 1981). FBIS, DR, SU (November 30, 1981), p. D2.

³⁷Ibid.

³⁸See Vladimir Korolev comment, op. cit.

³⁹Karachi Domestic Service, 1005 GMT (December 10, 1981). FBIS, DR, SA (December 11, 1981), p. F1.

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has secretly agreed...to allow the Pentagon to establish its bases, especially air and naval bases in the south of the country for use by the Rapid Deployment Force.⁴⁰

The Soviet media also tended to portray U.S. activities in Pakistan as a "justifiable" threat to Indian security interests and as fueling Indo-Pakistani tensions.

2-4 RECENT DEVELOPMENTS HEIGHTEN TENSIONS

On March 9, 1982, reports emanating from the Indian Defense Ministry indicated that Pakistan was

in the final preparations for an atomic bomb...(and) uranium was being transformed into plutonium in the 'Kanupp' reactor...near Karachi.⁴¹

A few weeks later when India's Foreign Ministry issued its annual report claiming that Reagan's decision to supply Pakistan with sophisticated types of arms would increase the danger of confrontation in South Asia, Izvestiya supported India's perception, noting that "India's concern is natural, since Pakistan has used arms against it three times in the past three and one-half decades."⁴²

A few weeks later, a Krasnaya Zvezda article, entitled "Islamabad is Eager to Join the 'Nuclear Club'," carefully outlined the extent of the Pakistani "threat." It cited an alleged CIA report--"Special Prediction of National Intelligence 31-81," (December 1981)--that drew the conclusion that

Pakistan could explode a nuclear device in the next three years and will continue to produce and

⁴⁰TASS, 1518 GMT (December 23, 1981). FBIS, DR, SU (December 24, 1981), p. D1.

⁴¹AFP (Hong Kong), 0930 GMT (March 9, 1982). FBIS, DR, SA (March 9, 1982), p. E1.

⁴²"There are Threats and Threats," Izvestiya (April 9, 1982), p. 4. FBIS, DR, SU (April 20, 1982), p. D4.

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stockpile fissionable material sufficient for the manufacture of four or five nuclear bombs a year.⁴³

In addition to this nuclear "capability," Krasnaya Zvezda specifically made note of Pakistan's efforts to seek multi-purpose means of delivery:

- (1) 40 U.S.-made F-16 fighter bombers capable of delivering nuclear weapons;
- (2) Chinese-made missiles supplied to the Pakistani Army on the basis of a secret 1981 agreement; and
- (3) West German missile firm Otrag will sell a large consignment of medium-range missiles to the Pakistani Army, Pakistan will then construct a plant for assembly of missiles from components manufactured by the FRG.⁴⁴

In closing, the article then noted that

no account is taken (in the U.S.) of the security interests of Pakistan's neighbors, in particular India... Indian military experts believe that the stockpiling of weapons in Pakistan's arsenals will inevitably lead to the disruption of the established correlation of forces in the region.⁴⁵

Toward the end of the year, Zia granted an interview to The Chonghadikit, Editor in Chief of the Bangkok Post. Zia made special note

⁴³This NIE is classified. Krasnaya Zvezda did not cite--as is customary Soviet practice--the open source reference to this classified document and its contents. See also V. Aristov, "Islamabad is Eager to Join the 'Nuclear Club'," Krasnaya Zvezda (April 13, 1982), p. 3. FBIS, DR, SU (April 27, 1982), p. DT.

⁴⁴Ibid.

⁴⁵See V. Aristov, op. cit., p. D2.

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of "excellent relations with the PRC...characterized by complete trust and confidence," but was very quick to point out that

We are not receiving military assistance from the U.S. We are only purchasing some military equipment...against cash payment and partly on credit obtained at market-related interest rates.⁴⁶

In other words, although Zia was quick to affirm his close relations with the PRC, he was at the same time quick to disavow himself (and Pakistan) of any obligation to the U.S.

Zia also made note of Pakistan's nuclear program. On the one hand, he justified Pakistan's "modest program of research and development in the field of nuclear energy" because Pakistan was poor in fossil fuel resources; adding

if we are unable to develop...nuclear energy the problems of our economy could become unmanageable, and by 1985 or 1986, we might have to spend our entire export earnings on oil imports.⁴⁷

On the other hand, Zia noted

we believe in the right of each state to have access to nuclear technology and to pursue scientific research and development in accordance with its own priorities... We would place our nuclear R&D program under any safeguard arrangements provided they are applied universally and on a non-discriminatory basis. (Emphasis added.)⁴⁸

Zia then referred to a Pakistani proposal submitted to India to permit inspection of each other's nuclear installations, which India had not yet agreed to, adding

as regards the nuclear capability of China you know that China made an unconditional pledge long ago not to be the first to use nuclear weapons under any circumstances. As such, non-nuclear states have no

⁴⁶Zia interview in Bangkok Post (September 26, 1982), pp. 5, 6. FBIS, DR, SA (September 28, 1982), p. F2.

⁴⁷Ibid., p. F3.

⁴⁸Ibid.

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cause to have any apprehensions about China's nuclear weapons capability.⁴⁹

In other words, Zia continued to be concerned about India's nuclear developments, "blind" to the Chinese, and keep all options open for Pakistan.

In summary, the net effect of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has been to increase tensions between Pakistan and India, ignite a local arms race, and stimulate nuclear proliferation. On the one hand, while the Soviet invasion did not appear to have negative consequences on Soviet-Indian relations, it did provide India with an opportunity to exploit the situation (much as they did in the wake of Gandhi's surprise electoral defeat in 1977) to acquire more sophisticated military hardware and critical technologies from the Soviet Union at favorable rates of exchange. Similarly, the Soviet invasion also created a situation which Zia has been successfully capitalizing on with the Reagan Administration (and the PRC) and has fueled Pakistan's appetite for more military assistance, nuclear technology and sophisticated means of delivery. The end result has been the creation of a local conventional arms race (indigenous in origin but fueled, in large part, by outside sources), stimulation of a local nuclear arms race and heightened tension; creating a situation that could lead to an explosion between India and Pakistan.

2-5 LOCAL WAR: INDO-PAKISTANI CONFLICT

Both India and Pakistan are "non-aligned" states and as such are relatively "free" from superpower influence. Although India has maintained very close relations with the USSR (particularly since the 1971 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation), it has pursued a policy of substitution and production of indigenous arms sources to ensure independence, despite its consistent "tilt" toward the USSR. In addition, despite the need to declare a "State of Emergency" in the summer of 1975, Gandhi's surprise electoral defeat by Desai in 1977 and Gandhi's return to power

⁴⁹Ibid.

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in January 1980, India's political and military elites have maintained a consensus and consistency in policy toward the USSR.

Pakistan, on the other hand, has evidenced internal cleavage among elites (leading to Zia's military coup in July 1977 and execution of Bhutto) and has seesawed in its relationship with the U.S. The U.S. "tilt" toward Pakistan during the 1969-1971 period was no longer necessary after the February 1972 Shanghai Communique. U.S.-Pakistani tensions were evident during the Ford and Carter Administrations over arms sales (A-7's to counter India's MiG-21's) and Pakistan's desire to acquire nuclear weapons (since India's May 1974 detonation). Even in the immediate aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, when the U.S. was willing to extend \$400 million in military assistance to Pakistan, Zia demanded \$1 billion (claiming \$400 million was "peanuts"). Only with the onset of the Reagan Administration in January 1981 did the U.S. once again "tilt" toward Pakistan. In return, the U.S. has acquired little (or no) influence on Pakistan. Zia continues to argue that Pakistan:

- (1) will not provide the U.S. bases (because it is non-aligned);
- (2) does not owe thanks to the U.S. for military assistance; and
- (3) will not curtail its nuclear program.

In summary, Zia and Pakistan are, for the U.S., uncontrollable; and in a local war, the USSR (over India) and the PRC (over Pakistan) are likely to exert greater influence over the course of events among their clients in the region.

The nature of any potential future local war, however, is likely to be more complex than the earlier wars between India and Pakistan. If we assume that the estimates noted by Indian and Pakistani AEC officials and political elites and Soviet and Western media sources are accurate; then between 1981-1985 both India and Pakistan will likely produce at least five nuclear weapons annually. Thus, in 1985, assuming potential inventories of 25 nuclear weapons each, each side will have the capability and the means of delivery to wreak a large amount of damage to the other. While the USSR and the PRC might provide a role in escalation control

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(over India and Pakistan respectively) in a local conflict, the U.S. could find itself in the unhappy situation of not having much influence either in preventing the conflict or over the course of events if a war broke out.

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SECTION 3 GENERAL WAR

India and Pakistan both adhere to a policy of non-alignment: India, ever since the inception of the movement in September 1961; and Pakistan, ever since it withdrew from CENTO in March 1979. The recent activities of both (noted in Sections I and II above) provide some indication of the role India and Pakistan might play were a general war to erupt between the superpowers.

3-1 NON-ALIGNMENT AND NEUTRALITY IN A SUPERPOWER CONFLICT

India, though clearly "tilting" toward the USSR (particularly since its August 9, 1971 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation), has clearly and consistently adhered to a policy of enlightened national self-interest. On the one hand, its position on the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was proper, if not initially cool. Ultimately its "understanding" of Soviet concerns in Afghanistan provided an example of unenthusiastic support, in return for past Soviet support rendered to India. On the other hand, if a general war broke out between the superpowers there would be little incentive for India to get involved. If India's national security were not directly endangered, it would likely declare a state of neutrality which would be consistent with its role as a non-aligned nation.

India's arms and nuclear policy, while heavily reliant upon the USSR (because of Soviet willingness to supply these items and to provide them at very favorable terms), has also sought both substitute sources for these goods and services and to develop an indigenous production capability. By engaging in this dual policy, India has made every effort to protect its non-aligned position by remaining "free" of any leverage the Soviets might attempt to wield over them. Such freedom presumably would be utilized to maintain a position of neutrality, consistent with non-alignment, if a general war erupted.

Pakistan, like India, would also likely declare a state of neutrality, employing its non-aligned status as the instrumentality to legitimize

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its policy. Pakistan, unlike India, would not feel any compunction about declaring neutrality, because it has not developed any particular deep-seated loyalties toward the U.S. (although it has, on the other hand, toward the PRC).

As already noted, when the U.S. offered Pakistan \$400 million in military assistance after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Zia rejected this sum as "peanuts" and demanded \$1 billion. Despite the increase in military assistance since the Reagan Administration took office, Zia still notes that he will not provide the U.S. bases nor does he owe the U.S. thanks for the assistance rendered.

In summary, the U.S. has little (if any) influence over Zia nor has it successfully developed much loyalty in Pakistan (witness Bhutto's execution, U.S. objections to the contrary). If a general war erupted (as long as the PRC remained on the sidelines) Pakistan, feeling little loyalty to the U.S., would probably claim neutrality.